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ROAD BLOCKS TO INSPECT DRIVERS' LICENSES
The hurrying motorist today finds road blocks set up to inspect
drivers' licenses one of his principal irritants. To a motorist without
a license, this method of inspection naturally causes great anxiety,
and so he may be disposed to contend that the setting up of a road
block to inspect drivers' licenses is unconstitutional.1
In the recent Kentucky case of Commonwealth v. Mitchell,2 the
defendant was forced to stop at a road block and ordered by state
police officers to display her operator's license. She failed to do so,
and it developed that she had never been issued an operator's license.
Defendant was then prosecuted in the Quarterly Court for operating
a motor vehicle without a driver's license.3 A dismissal of the action
was obtained on the ground that the use of a road block for the pur-
pose of detaining the defendant to check her license constituted a vio-
lation of her constitutional right of liberty by means of an illegal re-
straint or arrest. On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Circuit Court
affirmed the dismissal. In the present action, the Commonwealth sought
a certification of the law.4 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky took a
different view from that of the Circuit Court, holding that the act
of police officers in setting up a road block for motor vehicles for
the purpose of requiring drivers to display operators' licenses does not
involve an illegal restraint, an unlawful search, or an arrest in vio-
lation of any other constitutional right.
The contention in the Mitchell case that the accused was subjected
to an unlawful search and seizure, contrary to both the stateu and
"'At the very foundation of our state is the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions. Infringement of such individual
rights cannot be tolerated until we tire of democracy and are ready for communism
or a despotism. The enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of our government." Craven v. State, 148 Tenn.
517, 256 S.W. 431, 432 (1923); accord, Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d
633, 635 (1947)-
2355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962).
3"Unless another penalty is provided by law, any person who violates any
of the provisions of KRS 1864oo to 186.640 shall be fined not less than two dollars
nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned for not more than six months
or both." Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.99o(3) (Supp. 1962).
"'Where the punishment which might be inflicted includes imprisonment,
the Commonwealth cannot obtain a reversal of a misdemeanor case and so may
appeal to have the law certified without making a motion for a new trial." Ky.
Crim Code § 352(1).
u"The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions,
from unreasonable search and seizure; and no warrant shall issue to search any
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federal Constitutions, when detained by an officer for the sole purpose
of inspecting her license is not tenable. A mere detention under such
circumstances is not a search and seizure. When the operator is in-
tercepted by a police officer and requested to display his license, such
an act by the officer in itself constitutes neither a search not a seizure. 6
The essential distinction is that the operator by his own act pro-
duces the license; the officer does not search for it. A mere perfunctory
observation by the inspector of that which is in plain sight does not
constitute a search.7
Moreover, the momentary detention of a motorist for the sole pur-
pose of checking his operator's license does not constitute an arrest
or apprehensions The fact that a police officer detains a motorist for
the purpose of talking to him and asking him reasonable questions
does not necessarily mean that the person so stopped is arrested.9 This
element -of detention falls short of the act of actually seizing or holding
a person to answer for a suspected or alleged public offence. 10 Even
though such a detention does not amount to an arrest, it still involves
a restraint upon the person. Such restraint is not unlawful, however,
if it is carried out in good faith."1
The extent to which an individual's constitutional rights' 2 can be
limited by regulation under the state's police power 3 is a question
which has resulted in voluminous litigation. It is settled that the
validity of a state's regulation, purportedly enacted in accord with
places or seize any person or thing, without describing them as nearly as may be.
nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation." Ky. Const., Bill of
Rights § io.
GCity of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959).
TPeople v. Carnes, 173 Cal. App. 2d 559, 343 P.2d 626 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
People v. Murphy, 173 Cal. App. 2d 367, 343 P.2d 273 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); People
v. Hyde, 51 Cal. 2d 152, 331 P.2d 42 (1958); People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303
P.2d 721 (1956).
'Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg, 150 So. 2d 512, 515 (Miss. 1963).
'People v. King, 175 Cal. App. 2d 386, 346 P.2d 235, 238 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
'State v. Martin, 89 Kan. 678, 131 Pac. i19o (1913).
uSupra note 8.
"U.S. Const. amend. 4, 5, 14; Ky. Const., Bill of Rights §§ 2, 1o, 1i.
1"It is an attribute of soverign power to enact laws for the exercise of such
restraint and control over the citizen and his occupation as may be necessary to
promote the health, safety, and welfare of society. This power is known as the 'po-
lice power.' In its exercise the general assembly may provide that any occupation
which is the proper subject of the power may not be pursued by the citizen, ex-
cept (when] authorized by a license issued by public authority so to do. Such
enactment may require the payment of a fee, and the execution of a bond with
security, conditioned in view of the objects and purpose of the act, as a prerequisite
to the issuance of such license. What occupations are the proper subjects of this
power is a judicial question." Price v. People, 193 Ill. 114, 61 N.E. 844, 846 (19o);
accord, Spiegler v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 114, 74 N.E. 718, 721 (195o).
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its police power, depends upon the circumstances of each case and the
reasonableness of the regulation.14 Great stress must be placed upon
the term "reasonable" in order to understand that the test of state reg-
ulation, when considered in light of the due process clause of the Con-
stitution, is reasonableness as distinguished from arbitrary or capricious
action.' 5 Since the exercise of a state's police power has been held to
extend to legislation of laws relating to the public welfare, 16 it follows
that a state can regulate even at the expense of private rights.
7
It is immediately apparent that, from the setting up of a road
block for the purpose of inspecting operators' licenses, a direct con-
flict emanates between two paramount considerations: the public in-
terest and the individual's natural rights. Thus, it is essential that
we recognize the individual's rights and that we juxtapose the exercise
of these rights with the necessities of the general public.' s The auto-
mobile has long been considered a dangerous instrumentality in our
society.19 It has also long been recognized that regulations imposed
by the state legislature upon the use and operation of automobiles
are a valid exercise of the police power.20 The Kentucky statute, 21
which is similar to the statutes of many other states, requires all driv-
ers to obtain an operator's license. The statute has been held valid on
the ground that the right to operate an automobile in public is not a
natural and unrestrained right but a privilege subject to reasonable
regulation under the police power in the interest of public safety.
22
Since the requirement that an operator obtain a license is a rea-
sonable regulation under the police power, it follows 'that revocation
by the state for good cause is also valid. The suspension of the privi-
lege of operating a vehicle in a public place for failure to comply
14People v. Perretta, 253 N.Y. 3o5, 171 N.E. 72 (193o); Wulfsohn v. Burden,
241 N.Y. 288, 15o N.E. 120 (1925).
"State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101 (1911).
l'West Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 3oo U.S. 379 (1937).
2TNew York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
SSupra note 6, at 789.
'Supra note 6, at 788; Smith v. Commonwealth, 175 Ky. 286, 194 S.W. 367
(1917)-
""Since the preservation and the safety of highways is a matter of vital pub-
lic concern, and an appropriate subject for the exercise of the police power of
the state, users of the highway must submit to reasonable rules and regulations
adopted to attain these ends...." Commonwealth v. Abell, 275 Ky. 802, 122 S.W.2d
757, 76o (1938); accord, Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, 235 Ky. 265,
30 S.W.2d 968 (193o).
""Every person except those exempted by KRS 186.42o and KRS 186430 shall
before operating a motor vehicle upon a highway secure an operator's license as
provided in this chapter." Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186410 (1) (Supp. 1962).
-2Commonwealth v. Harris, 278 Ky. 218, 128 S.W.2d 579 (1939).
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with reasonable regulations does not constitute a denial of due
process. 2
3
It appears that utilization of a road block is the only practical and
reliable method available to the state to insure that persons without
licenses, either because they never had them or have had them re-
voked, will not continue to drive. The leading case of City of Miami
v. Aronovitz24 proclaims that the effectiveness of a road block for
the purpose of inspecting drivers' licenses is a reasonable preventive
device. The state derives its power to affect such a protective measure
as a road block by statutes requiring that an operator's license be in
the driver's possession and that the license be displayed upon de-
mand.2 5 These statutes have been held to confer the necessary power
upon the state to effectuate a motor vehicle road block.2 6 Further-
more, a statute requiring the operator to display his license upon
demand has been interpreted to mean that he must display his license
for the purpose of inspection as well as for identification in the
event of an accident or statutory violation.27
Many states have statutes penalizing a driver for failure to display
his license upon demand. However, a failure to display upon demand
is not conclusive evidence that the accused has no license. Although a
rebuttable presumption arises that the accused has no license, no
conviction can be had based upon his failure to display it upon de-
mand.2S
Moreover, the question of who has the authority to demand the
display of an operator's license is answered by the statutes. The Mis-
sissippi statute is illustrative of a broad conferring of the power, ex-
tending it to justices of the peace, peace officers, field deputies and
n"Time has proven, however, that because of the severe penalties attendant
upon serious traffic violations, including suspension or revocation of drivers'
licenses, this requirement has become an essential segment of our laws for the con-
trol and prevention of traffic accidents and fatalities." Supra note 6, at 787; ac-
cord, Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 9o8 (Ky. 1957); Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S.W.2d 141
(Ky. 1951).
2'114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959).
"The licensee shall have his license in his immediate possession at all times
when driving a motor vehicle and shall display it upon demand...." Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 186.51o (Supp. 1962).
'Supra note 8; supra note 6; Ce, Murphy v. State, 194 Tenn. 698, 254 S.V.2d
979 (1953).
2,Supra note 6.
"."However, no person charged with violating this section shall be convicted
if he produces in court an operator's or chauffer's license theretofore issued to him
and valid at the time of his arrest." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 322.15 (1957). People v. Meyer,
194 App. Div. 822, 186 N.Y.S. 434 (1921).
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motor vehicle inspectors.20 The Massachusetts statute authorizes any
police officer who is in uniform or who displays his badge to make
such a demand.3 0 The Tennessee statute, however, limits this un-
restricted right to state highway patrolmen.3 ' In Tennessee, other
peace officers are authorized to examine the operator's licenses only
when the driver has violated a state statute or municipal or county
ordinance or has been involved in an accident.
32
The statutory interpretation of roadblocks to inspect drivers'
licenses necessarily involves the question of where and when a road
block may be set up. Though there are no decisions or statutes on this
subject, it would seem that road blocks must be confined to public
thoroughfares. To set up a road block on private property would con-
stitute a trespass. The time element, however, can have no natural
restrictions, and it is assumed that the state will select the schedule
most suitable to the ends to be accomplished. A road block cannot
be erected, however, at a time or place which would cause unreason-
able inconvenience to motorists.
Though the courts uphold the validity of road blocks for the
purpose of checking drivers' licenses, they are alert to strike down
any act manifesting a temptation to use this power as a guise for the
purpose of perpetrating an unlawful search and seizure. In other
words, the law authorizes an officer to stop a driver and ask him to
show his license, but the law will not tolerate the utilization of the
statutory authority as a mere subterfuge for the sole purpose of
searching the person, the car, or the luggage.33
The test of probable cause has been formulated for determining
whether a search or seizure without a warrant is constitutionally
valid. Good faith alone is not sufficient showing of probable cause.
In addition to good faith, there must be reliable facts and circum-
stances which would lead a reasonable man to believe that -the vehicle
which is stopped and searched is being operated in violation of the
law.8 4 Thus, the conclusion is drawn that a mere search for evidence
as such is a violation of the fourth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.35
2'Miss. Code Ann. § 81o8 (1942).
3'Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 311 Mass. 177, 40 N.E.2d 261 (1942); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 9o, § 25 (1954).
n'Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-707 (Supp. 1962); Cox v. State, 181 Tenn. 344, 181
S.W.2d 38 (1944).
-'Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-709 (Supp. 1962).
Supra note i; United States v. Bumbola, 23 F.2d 696 (N.D.N.Y. 1928).
aCarroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Lawson v. United States, 254
F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1958).
sApplication of Houlihan, 31 F.R.D. 145 (D.N.D. 1962).
